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FOREWORD
To support warfighters in the 21st century, Army
and joint space operations must adapt to a congested,
contested, and competitive international space environment. This monograph examines how the Army is
postured to meet current and future space-based support needs to conduct unified land operations. It also
provides recommendations regarding how to facilitate the best evolutionary path for future Army space
activities to meet the changing environment for unified land operations as well as the diverse challenges
of ongoing global operations, technological advances
by potential adversaries, increased international
competition, and domestic resource constraints.
The monograph posits that the Army should retain its current focus on space operations as crossdomain support for terrestrial warfighter operations.
It also suggests that the development of such support
should include stakeholder and proponency issues
with regard to cyberspace operations. Continuing to
advance policies and strategies that embrace the joint,
interagency, and international aspects of space operations will help ensure reliable and resilient support to
operational and tactical commanders in any theater
of operation.
			
			
			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Is the Army properly postured to meet current
and future space-based support needs to conduct unified land operations? This monograph addresses this
fundamental question in two main sections:
•	Current Army Space Operations. Considering
the mandate by the National Command Authority in January 2012 to operate effectively in
space, this section examines space capabilities
as they are currently organized for the soldier
and other joint warfighters. First, it identifies
the five joint space mission areas as they compare to the Army’s six warfighting functions.
Next, the section presents an overview of current Army space forces, then builds the context
of joint space forces and offers examples of
international partnerships.
•	Envisioned Future Army Space Operations.
This section assesses current Army activities
oriented to meet the evolving needs of the future space environment. This includes not only
the continued integration and exploitation of
existing space capabilities, but also the development and deployment of Army space support operations that provide responsive support to operational and tactical commanders in
theater. Rather than delve into all joint space
mission areas, it focuses on the three areas of
current Army emphasis: future space force enhancement, future space force application, and
the connection between space and cyberspace
operations. The section then compares the direction of Army space endeavors against national policy and guidance to identify any critical deficiencies or incongruities.
viii

This monograph is limited to unrestricted and unclassified open source information, thus any classified
discussion must occur at other appropriate venues.
The evolution of Army space operations is well documented in many sources. Therefore, this monograph
serves not as a comprehensive history or detailed critique of the Army’s myriad accomplishments. Rather,
it serves as a primer for current and future spacebased operations to provide senior policymakers,
decisionmakers, military leaders, and their respective
staffs with an overall appreciation for existing Army
space capabilities and the challenges, opportunities,
and risks associated with their use in joint operations.

ix

EVOLVING ARMY NEEDS
FOR SPACE-BASED SUPPORT
The U.S. Army has been involved with spacebased military operations for well over a half-century.
During this time, space operations have changed from
a realm exclusive to scientists and engineers; to highly
classified activities largely unknown to the general
population; to the unveiling of space-based communication, imagery, surveillance, and environment capabilities that have become a foundation for all modern
warfare. Today, such support is so ingrained in daily
operations that most soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines assume it has been, and always will be, available
for their use. But with such reliance comes a vulnerability that potential adversaries may try to exploit.
Is the Army properly postured to meet current and
future space-based support needs to conduct unified
land operations? This monograph addresses this fundamental question first by examining current Army
space operations within the broader context of joint
operations. Next, it surveys key aspects of Army space
activities envisioned for future operations. Finally,
it compares the direction of Army space endeavors
against national policy and guidance to identify any
critical deficiencies or incongruities.
This monograph is limited to unrestricted and unclassified open source information, thus any classified
discussion must occur in other appropriate venues.
The evolution of Army space operations is well-documented in many sources. Therefore, this monograph
serves not as a comprehensive history or detailed
critique of the Army’s myriad accomplishments in
space operations, but rather as a primer for current
and future space-based operations to provide senior
policymakers, decisionmakers, military leaders, and
1

their respective staffs with an overall appreciation for
existing Army space capabilities and the challenges,
opportunities, and risks associated with their use in
joint operations.
CURRENT ARMY SPACE OPERATIONS
The necessity of the U.S. military to operate effectively in space was emphasized by the National
Command Authority in January 2012 when President
Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta provided strategic guidance for sustaining U.S.
global leadership in the 21st century. Specifically, they
directed that:
DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability,
and resiliency in cyberspace and space.1

Space capabilities comprise many diverse systemsof-systems, which include ground-based infrastructure, satellites and space launch vehicles, and the
electromagnetic links that connect them.2 But rather
than discuss individual space systems, we will instead
examine space capabilities as they are currently organized for the soldier and other joint warfighters. This includes an overview of current Army space forces within the context of joint space forces and of international
partnerships.
Space Capability Requirements.
While a comprehensive knowledge of the space
domain is not necessary for all warfighters, planners
and senior officers should have a basic understanding
of how space operations integrate and enhance their
2

domain military operations. To facilitate this understanding, we will briefly examine the major mission
areas of space operations and compare them to Army
warfighting functions. Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Space
Operations, has evolved and expanded significantly
over the past decade to reflect the increasing integration of activities in the space domain with those
in the traditional domains of land, sea, and air. The
latest version (May 2013) addresses the fundamentals of military space operations, the command and
control of space forces, the roles and responsibilities
of Service components, and the methods of planning
for space operations.3 First, let us review the five major mission areas: space situational awareness; space
force enhancement; space support; space control; and
space force application.
Space situational awareness (SSA) provides the
foundation for all space operations by characterizing
the ongoing activities in the space domain. It has only
recently been identified as a separate mission area;
previous joint space doctrine listed SSA as a functional capability under the Space Control mission.4 SSA
constantly assesses the status of U.S. and cooperative
space systems as well as those of multinational activity, to include that of potential adversaries. This assessment requires four functional capabilities. First is the
ability to detect, track, and identify objects in space in
order to establish and maintain an accurate catalog to
utilize as part of a common operating picture. Second
is the ability to conduct the threat warning and assessment necessary to attribute and differentiate causes of
space effects among environment conditions, system
anomalies, and potential hostile actions. Third is the
ability to characterize not only observed space activity
but also the possible strategy and intent of such activity, as well as the nature of any possible threat to the
3

ground, electromagnetic link, or space element of the
system. The fourth functional capability is that of data
integration and exploitation to help tie together the
multisource data from the other three SSA functional
capabilities in iterative processes that also enhance
the functions.5
Space force enhancement capabilities increase
the combat potential of the joint force by providing
space-based support that improves effectiveness and
reduces confusion. This is especially valuable for the
joint force commanders who require access to denied
areas that cannot be provided by traditional domainbased capabilities. The space force enhancement mission area comprises seven functional capabilities. The
first is the ability to provide the necessary intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) through space
operations in a similar manner that ISR is provided
through the traditional domain operations, except
from a much higher vantage point. The next two capabilities, launch detection and missile tracking, use
some common infrastructure and assessment methods; they each provide timely notification for the
protection of joint forces as well as space assets. Environmental monitoring provides joint forces with data
regarding meteorological and oceanographic conditions as well as factors in the space environment that
may affect joint operations, such as solar flares, which
may temporarily affect certain radio frequency transmission. The fifth functional capability, satellite communications (SATCOM), has become so ingrained in
military operations that some may consider it a necessary vice, a force enhancement. Likewise, space-based
capabilities for positioning, navigation, and timing
(PNT), such as those provided by the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation, are not only
critical to the vast majority of military operations, also
4

extremely important to commercial users and ordinary
citizens worldwide. Navigation warfare (NAVWAR)
is the seventh functional capability intended to assure
friendly use of PNT information and to prevent adversary use of the same by leveraging space, cyberspace,
and electronic warfare assets.6
Space support, like SSA, provides three functional
capabilities that serve as the foundation to operate
and sustain space forces. First is spacelift, which is
the ability to deliver satellites and material into the required orbit around Earth. This requires space launch
vehicles and launch infrastructure, as well as range
operations, to ensure the safe and reliable launch and
initial orbit attainment. Second, once a satellite is in
orbit, space support is the basis of the functional capability for satellite operations that establishes the
proper telemetry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C)
links necessary to not only maneuver and operate the
satellite and its payloads, but also to monitor and sustain its health status. Third, the ability for reconstitution of space forces is required to maintain operational
satellite constellations by reconfiguring or replacing
damaged satellites, repositioning satellites to cover
for temporary gaps in coverage, or replenishing obsolete or expired satellites.7
Space control involves the ability to ensure the
freedom of action for U.S. and friendly forces in space
and, when necessary, to negate adversary space capabilities. It is divided into two functional capabilities:
offensive space control (OSC) and defensive space
control (DSC). OSC uses prevention measures to preclude “an adversary’s hostile use of U.S. or third-party
space systems/services to support their operations.”8
Prevention activities may utilize all forms of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic—to protect the joint forces’ advantages in
space. OSC also may involve space negation, which
5

consists of “active defensive and offensive measures to
deceive, disrupt, degrade, deny, or destroy an adversary’s space capabilities.”9 DSC operations deal with
preserving “the ability to exploit space capabilities via
active and passive actions, while protecting friendly
space capabilities from attack, interference, or unintentional hazards.”10 While they focus on responses to
deliberate threats, such as GPS or SATCOM jammers,
DSC operations also focus on incidental hazards, such
as space debris, radio frequency interference, and
solar effects.11
Space force application focuses on “combat operations in, through, and from space to influence the
course and outcome of conflict by holding terrestrial
targets at risk.”12 It includes activities such as ballistic missile defense and land- or sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.13
Clearly, military space operations are a joint venture. But how do Army forces leverage such capabilities to support its mission? In his March 2014 testimony to Senate Armed Service Committee, Lieutenant
General David L. Mann, Commanding General of
the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
and Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/
ARSTRAT) noted that:
space-based capabilities leveraged and employed
across the National space enterprise enable each of
these [six Army] warfighting functions. Virtually every Army operation relies on space capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of the force.14

This dependence is evident in Table 1, which depicts how specific joint space operations mission areas
support the six Army warfighting functions of mission
command, movement and maneuver, intelligence,
fires, sustainment, and protection.
6

Army Warfighting Functions
Joint Space Operations
Mission Areas

Mission
Command

Movement
and
Maneuver

Intelligence

Fires

Sustainment

Protection

Space Situational Awareness
Detect/Track/Identify

x

Threat Warning & Assessment

x

x

Characterization

x

x

x

x

Data Integration & Exploitation

x

x

x

x

Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reece

x

x

x

x

x

Launch Detection

x

x

x

x

x

Missile Tracking

x

x

x

x

x

Environmental Monitoring

x

x

x

x

x

x

Satellite Communications

x

x

x

x

x

x

Positioning, Navigation, & Timing

x

x

x

x

x

x

Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR)

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Space Force Enhancement

Space Supports
Spacelift

x

Satelite Operations

x

x

x

x

Reconstitution of Space Forces

x

x

x

Space Control
Offensive Space Control

x

x

x

x

x

Defensive Space Control

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Space Force Application
Ballistic Missile Defence
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

x

Table 1. Joint Space Operations Support
of Army Operations.
Mann summarized the importance and scope of
space operations to the Army with the statement that:
integrating space capabilities enables commanders,
down to the lowest echelon, to conduct Unified Land
Operations through decisive action and operational
adaptability.15
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Let us now examine the specific elements of the
Army total force that are dedicated to providing such
critical space-based resources to all warfighters.
Army Space Forces.
The current structure of USASMDC/ARSTRAT
had both evolutionary and revolutionary growth from
its rather humble origins back in October 1957 as the
Redstone Anti-Missile Missile Systems Office located
at Redstone Arsenal, AL. During the 1960s through
the 1980s, Army space-related efforts emphasized this
anti-ballistic missile mission with programs such as
Sentinel (the Lyndon Johnson administration), Safeguard (the Richard Nixon administration), and “Star
Wars”—the Strategic Defense Initiative (the Ronald
Reagan administration). These efforts reflected the
ebb and flow of strategic arms buildups and limitation
treaties that typified the Cold War between the United
States and the Soviet Union.16 President Reagan had
a broader view of space operations and took actions
toward the creation of a unified command dedicated
to the space domain, and on September 23, 1985, U.S.
Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established in
Colorado Springs, CO.17 The Army formed a planning
group to design the Army component to this new joint
command that became the Army Space Agency and
eventually grew to become the U.S. Army Space Command, a field operating agency, on April 7, 1988.18
In 1991, Operation DESERT STORM ushered in a
new era of modern warfare that successfully exploited
space-based force enhancement in combat operations
across all traditional domains. The lessons learned
from this campaign expanded the Army’s view of
space support to expeditionary operations and led to
the creation of deployed teams to provide space sup8

port and tactical missile warning as part of a greater
emphasis on theater missile defense. The national missile defense was reduced in scope by President George
H. W. Bush to the Global Protection against Limited
Strikes (GPALS), with the Army taking lead on much
of the system-of-systems development. The rest of
the decade saw many organizational changes as the
Army consolidated its space and missile development
efforts and operations.19
On October 1, 1997, the field operating agency of
the U.S. Space and Strategic Defense Command was
redesignated a major Army command—the U.S. Army
Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC). The
new command’s mission included a role as the Army
proponent for space and ballistic missile defense and
command of the 1st Satellite Control Battalion as well
as joint responsibilities as the Army component to the
U.S. Space Command (ARSPACE).20 The operational
structure of USASMDC continued to evolve, and the
final major development came with the 2002 change
to the Unified Command Plan that disestablished
USSPACECOM and transferred its mission functions
to a “new” U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).21
Consequently, USASMDC/ARSTRAT became the
Army service component command to the new
USSTRATCOM.22
In its current mission, USASMDC/ARSTRAT:
conducts space and missile defense operations and
provides planning, integration, control and coordination of Army forces and capabilities in support of U.S.
Strategic Command missions (strategic deterrence, integrated missile defense, and space operations)

as well as continues to serve as the Army proponent for
space and missile defense technology development.23
9

The Commanding General, USASMCD/ARSTRAT
also serves as the commander of the USSTRATCOM
Joint Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), the “third hat”
of command for that position.24 The vision for the
command views all of these responsibilities not only
in terms of immediate warfighting needs, but also in
medium- and long-range planning for future force
requirements:
As the Army’s force modernization proponent for
space, global missile defense, and high altitude; and
as the Army’s operational integrator for global missile
defense, USASMDC/ARSTRAT will focus on three
core tasks:
1. Provide trained and ready space and missile defense forces and capabilities to the warfighter and
the nation (today).
2. Build future space and missile defense forces (tomorrow).
3. Research, test, and integrate space, missile defense, cyber, directed energy, and related technologies (day-after-tomorrow).25

To implement this vision within the current organization, the “today” part of the mission is led by
the Deputy Commanding General-Operations; the
“tomorrow” portion is headed by the Director, Future Warfare Center; and the “day-after-tomorrow”
is managed by the Director, Technical Center.26 The
detailed doctrinal aspects of these operations are presented in Field Manual (FM) 3-14, Army Space Operations.27 The remainder of this section focuses on current Army space operations in general terms, and the
next section discusses various future aspects. Table 2
provides a summary of the current major Army space
units that will be discussed.
10

Unit

Mission

1st Space Brigade

Conducts continuous space force
enhancement, space support, and space
control operations in support of combatant commanders, enabling shaping and
decisive operations.

53rd Signal Battalion

Manages satellite payload control of the
DoD Wideband Constellation by operating
and maintaining global Wideband Satellite
Communications Operations Centers and a
Defense Satellite Communications System
Certification Facility.

1st Space Battalion

117th Space Battalion

Provides theater support to warfighters:
- Ballistic Missile Early Warning (JTAGS)
- Army Space Support Teams
- Commercial Imagery Team
Colorado Army National Guard unit providing space support:
- Army Space Support Teams
- Commercial Imagery Team

100th Missile Defense Brigade
(GMD)

Operates the GMD fire control network,
provides positive operational control of
ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely,
AK, and Vandenberg AFB, CA, and ensures
the protective security of the systems
deployed there.

49th Missile Defense Battalion

Headquarters and Fire Direction Center at
Fort Greely, Alaska.

Joint Space Operations
Mission Areas
Space Force Enhancement
Space Support

Space Force Enhancement
Space Support

Space Force Enhancement

Space Force Enhancement

Space Force Enhancement
Space Force Application

Space Force Enhancement
Space Force Application

Detachment 1 at Vandenberg AFB for GBI
operations support.

Missile Defense Detachments

AN/TPY-2 radar detachments that provide
missile defense support to geographic
commands:
- Detachment 10 (U.S. Pacific Command)
- Detachment 11 (U.S. European
Command)
- Detachment 12 (U.S Central Command)
- Detachment 13 (U.S. European
Command)

Space Force Enhancement
Space Force Application

Table 2. Major Army Space Operations Units.28
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1st Space Brigade.
The 1st Space Brigade is a multicomponent brigade established as a provisional unit in April 2003
and formally activated on May 25, 2005. The history of
its three battalions goes back even further, the initial
unit being the 1st Satellite Control (SATCON) Battalion created in May 1995 due to the expanded Army
responsibilities for military satellite communications
following Operation DESERT STORM. The battalion grew to five companies located worldwide, and
on October 15, 2005, the unit became the 53rd Signal
Battalion (SATCON).29 Regarding its value to the
warfighter, communications ranks among the most
important of space-based enablers.30
Although space operations were making great
strides in operationalization with the formation of
USSPACECOM and its service components, the tactical Army was still largely unaware of the potential
benefits. To help bridge this gap, the 1st Space Battalion was established on December 15, 1999, to provide theater support for missile warning and space
force enhancement. The initial structure comprised
four Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) to provide
space products and five Joint Tactical Ground Stations
(JTAGS) to provide ballistic missile early warning. As
the need for deployed space support grew, additional
ARSSTs and JTAGS were added as well as Commercial Imagery Teams to leverage space products for a
broader range of sources.31
Serving as the Army National Guard counterpart
of the 1st Space Battalion is the 117th Space Battalion,
tasked to:

12

enable operations by maximizing military utilization
of space-based assets to include satellite imagery,
missile warning systems, satellite communications,
space-based weather and global positioning system
capabilities.32

Originally formed as the 193rd Space Support Battalion in September 2001, it was redesignated to its current number in October 2007. The 117th Space Battalion includes 11 ARSSTs and one Center for Innovative
Technology (CIT), which may also perform defense
support to civil authorities (DSCA) missions. With
the exception of support for Hurricane Katrina recovery, most of the DSCA operations have been limited
to Colorado, such as imagery and mapping support
for incident commanders during wildfires near Fort
Collins, CO, in 2012.33
100th Missile Defense Brigade
(Ground-based Missile Defense).
The 100th Missile Defense Brigade (Ground-based
Missile Defense [GMD]) was activated on October
16, 2003, in Colorado Springs, CO, as a multicomponent unit of Army active and National Guard soldiers
tasked to defend the homeland from ballistic missile
attacks. In January 2004, the 49th Missile Defense Battalion was activated at Fort Greely, AK, as an Alaska
National Guard unit tasked to operate the groundbased interceptors (GBI) stationed there.34 These units
brought to fruition the vision of the President George
W. Bush administration to field a national missile defense rapidly following the U.S. withdrawal from the
1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002. The deployment of GBI systems and support equipment was

13

designed to be an evolutionary process that would allow for technology insertion as well as adaptability to
the changing threat environment.35
Part of the brigade’s evolution was the establishment of detachments for GBI and warning radar operations. In May 2011, Detachment 1 was established at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, as a unit of the California National Guard, formally culminating a 7-year
effort to establish a force to secure and monitor the
GBI systems located there.36 Detachments were also
established to operate the Army Navy/Transportable
Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2),
a high-resolution, phased-array radar designed specifically for ballistic missile defense.37 These detachments are located within geographic combatant command areas of responsibility: Detachment 10 in the
U.S. Pacific Command; Detachments 11 and 13 in the
U.S. European Command; and Detachment 12 in the
U.S. Central Command.
Ongoing Army Space Operations Support.
The global nature of Army space operations is
reflected in the slogan, “The sun never sets on USASMDC/ARSTRAT.”38 This is not an idle claim. Indeed, ARSSTs and CITs have been deployed to the U.S.
Central Command on 86 occasions since 2001.39 Space
Support Elements (SSEs) provide support to deployed
headquarters and brigade combat teams as the staff’s
focal point for maximizing space-related capabilities
for intelligence (G-2), operations (G-3), and information (G-6).40 Also, expertise for SSEs and ARSSTs can
support the joint planning process through the development of Annex N, Space Operations, to operational
orders for supported joint commanders.41 JTAGS
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operate from strategic positions in the U.S. Pacific
Command and U.S. Central Command to provide accurate and timely missile warning data—launch location, flight tracking, and predicted impact area—to
operational communities writ large.42
For space force enhancement, the Army has critical
roles in the tracking and communications for friendly
forces. USASMDC/ARSTRAT has operated the Mission Management Center for friendly force tracking
(FFT; formerly blue force tracking) since its beginning
in October 2001 with support to combat operations in
Afghanistan. These support operations have become
thoroughly integrated into joint forces to provide the
PNT data necessary to enable confident and decisive
maneuver using over 50 types of tracking devices.
The system currently processes over one million location tracks each day to provide a common operating
picture to forces worldwide.43 USASMDC/ARSTRAT
also operates Wideband SATCOM Operations Centers (WSOCs) and Regional SATCOM Support Centers (RSSC) in six locations worldwide—three in the
continental United States and one each in Hawaii,
Germany, and Japan.44 With SATCOM as the Army’s
top space priority, these centers are undergoing the
modernization and equipment replacement necessary
to assure continued compatibility with new communication satellite systems.45
Joint Space Forces.
In addition to the efforts of ARSTRAT, other
military service components also participate in both
providing and utilizing space-based support to the
warfighter. The U.S. Air Force component oversees
space launch and satellite on-orbit checkout; operates
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a ground-based satellite control network; operates
several satellite constellations to accomplish all forms
of space force enhancement; and operates groundbased radars that support space situational awareness and ballistic missile warning. The U.S. Navy
component is implemented through the commander,
U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, and focuses on network
operations, associated space-control activities, satellite communication, and space situational awareness.
The U.S. Marine Corps component does not operate
any satellite systems but does focus on supporting
space operations planning as well as integrating space
force enhancement decentralized, combined arms
operations.46
To accomplish the command and control of joint
space forces, USSTRATCOM uses the Joint Force Component Command for Space (JFCC Space) designated
as the commander, 14th Air Force, and headquartered
at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. JFCC Space is comprised of three operations centers—the Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC), the Joint Navigation Warfare Center, and the Missile Warning Center—that
together serve to provide operational employment
of worldwide joint space forces.47 JFCC Space also
serves as the Global Space Coordinating Authority,
which works with any Space Coordinating Authorities (SCAs) designated by joint force commanders in
geographic combatant commands.48
In addition to the military service components’
space missions, there are many Department of Defense
(DoD) agencies and other government groups that also
contribute significantly to the success of joint space operations. These organizations and their relevant areas
of support are summarized in Table 3. As indicated,
some of the services that they provide may include
products and services from commercial space users.
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Support Agency

Areas of Support

Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA)

Military and commercial satellite and
network

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Military and commercial geospatialintelligence products (e.g., maps, charts,
navigation data, etc.)

National Security Agency/Central Security
Service (NSA/CSS)

Signals intelligence, information assurance, and cryptological support

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Military intelligence and analysis from:
- Missile & Space Intelligence Center
- Defense Special Missile & Aerospace
Center

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

Support for counter-weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) efforts

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

Research, development, acquisition, and
operation of national overhead reconnaissance systems

National Air & Space Intelligence Center
(NASIC)

Assessment of foreign air & space threats

Assessment of potential adversary satelNational Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) lite jammers or other electronic warfare
against space systems
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

Military and commercial atmospheric data
collection and dissemination

Missile Defense Agency (MDA)

Develop, test, and field an integrated and
layered ballistic missile defense system

Table 3. Agencies and Organizations
Supporting Joint Space Operations.49
International Partnerships.
Joint space doctrine promulgates that:
international cooperation in military space-based ISR
systems with allies and other partners may contribute to US national security objectives by enhancing
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interoperability, supporting coalition operations, and
building partnership capacity.50

But these advantages are not limited to the ISR applications of space operations; DoD policy dictates that:
DoD will cooperate with interagency, international,
and commercial partners to define and promote safe
and responsible space operations. This includes sharing space situational awareness and flight-safety information, as well as supporting the development
of transparency and confidence-building measures
and behavioral norms promoting responsible space
operations.51

Army space forces have embraced these mandates
and are working with military forces of many nations
in diverse mission areas of space operations. For example, members of the Australian Defense Force work
in concert with 53rd Signal Battalion soldiers at the
WSOC in Hawaii, even earning the right to wear the
U.S. space badge.52 Also, partnerships are being fostered by JFCC-IMD via a long-term campaign called
“Nimble Titan” to bring representatives from foreign militaries together to collaborate on global missile defense.53 Participation in annual exercises has
grown from eight countries in 2008 to 22 countries
contributing in 2014.54
ENVISIONED FUTURE ARMY
SPACE OPERATIONS
This section assesses current Army activities oriented to meet the evolving needs of the future space
environment. This includes not only the continued
integration and exploitation of existing space capa-
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bilities, but also the development and deployment
of “Army space support operations over time to provide dedicated, responsive theater focused support to
operational and tactical commanders.”55 Rather than
delve into all joint space mission areas, this focuses on
the three areas of current Army emphasis: future space
force enhancement, future space force application,
and the connection between space and cyberspace operations. It then compares the direction of such Army
space endeavors against national policy and guidance
to identify any critical deficiencies or incongruities.
Ready Space Capabilities for the Future
Enhancement.
Despite the extreme velocities at which space objects travel, the laws of physics dictate that satellites
are fixed in their relative orbital framework. Recognizing this, USASMDC/ARSTRAT is conducting three
Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs)
to provide timely and tailored space-based communications and imagery support as well as prompt and
responsive space launch capabilities.
Traditionally, military satellites have been large
space vehicles with energy storage devices and redundant payload systems designed for years of service.
While very capable, their operations could hardly be
defined as agile or tactical. The USASMDC Technical
Center has been exploring the use of microsatellites
(10-100 kilograms) and nanosatellites (1-10 kilograms)
with the aim of exploiting their benefits for the tactical
warfighter:
Appropriate constellations of nanosatellites and microsatellites in low earth orbit can provide a high de-
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gree of persistence for the warfighter which he or she
can depend upon, much like the GPS is today. The
presence of a proliferated constellation of relatively
short life nano- or microsatellites allow for technology
refresh opportunities and are problematic to adversaries who might want to eliminate space-based support
to the warfighter. Technology demonstrations such as
SMDCONE, Kestrel Eye, NanoEye, and SATS, together with the dedicated launch capability provided by
the Multipurpose NanoMissile System, can help establish the case for inexpensive space force enhancement
for the tactical warfighter through low cost, rapidly
developed nanosatellite constellations.56

Such satellites could be used in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) situations for such uses as exfiltrating
data from unattended ground sensors, providing
force enhancement coverage to remote operating locations, or augmenting existing space assets to support
temporary upsurges in activities.
The first Army nanosatellite was successfully
launched on December 8, 2010, marking the end of
a drought of Army launches that had lasted over 50
years. The satellite, SMDC-ONE, rode to space as a
secondary payload on a commercial Falcon 9 rocket;
its primary mission of about 30 days was to demonstrate data receipt and transmission with ground stations.57 Additional nanosatellites have been launched,
most notably one in December 2013 in support of a
U.S. Southern Command initiative to expand communication coverage for missions to include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations evaluated
in partnership with Brazil and Peru. Two additional
nanosatellite launches are scheduled for launch in
December 2014.58
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Kestrel Eye is an Army lead JCTD to develop a
nanosatellite that can deliver 1.5-meter-resolution visible imagery directly to warfighters in theater without
any interim data relay or filtering. It is designed to be
tactically responsive, low-cost, and relatively durable
with an operational life greater than 1 year. In essence,
Kestrel Eye attempts to extend the operational concept of the unmanned aerial vehicle into space. With
the appropriate constellation size, Kestrel Eye could
provide persistent coverage accessible by handheld
devices by warfighters in any theater of operation. 59
Having a fleet of highly capable nanosatellites is
of little use if they cannot be placed into the space domain in a prompt and effective manner. Current space
launch schedule lead times are typically measured in
years. To break this paradigm, the Army is leading
another JCTD, the Soldier-Warfighter Operationally
Responsive Deployer for Space (SWORDS). The goal
is to leverage off-the-shelf technology and equipment
to develop a low-cost vehicle ($1 million procurement
cost per vehicle) that can achieve a launch cycle of 24
hours from storage call up to launch ready. The program includes ground engine testing and suborbital
flights before a full orbital test flight.60
The three key JCTDs being pursued by
USASMDC/ARSTRAT to prepare more agile and effective tactical space force enhancement programs
are summarized in Table 4. Again, these are not the
complete portfolio of the Army space technical center;
other efforts include some diverse missions as highaltitude and persistent airship systems, such as the
Long Duration Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV).
For now, let us change focus to future space force application in contested A2/AD environments.
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System

Description & Mission
Highlights

Cost Goals

SMDC Nanosatellite
Program (SNaP)

• F unctionally effective data/
communication capability
• Low-burden Beyond Line of
Sight (BLOS) capability
• Multi-functional relay
capability
• Tailored constellation mission matching

Less than $1 million
per satellite production

Kestrel Eye

• G
 raphical User Interface
(GUI) on Personal Digital
Assistant (PDA)
• Same-pass tactical user
tasking and image delivery
• Store / forward imagery
passing
• Tasking, Processing, Exploitation and
Dissemination (TPED)
integration

$1 million per satellite
production

Soldier-Warfighter
Operationally
Responsive Deployer for
Space (SWORDS)

• Launch on demand
$1 million per launch vehicle
• Optimized orbit
placement
• Combatant Command
launch operation
flexibility
• Rapid augmentation in event
of hostilities via low-cost
deployable launcher

Table 4. Army Space Joint Capability Technology
Demonstrations (JCTDs).61
Future Force Application.
While the GMD units in Alaska and California provide significant ballistic missile defense capabilities,
USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues not only to refine
and enhance these existing systems, but also to look
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at new technologies for anti-ballistic missile uses. One
example is the use of directed energy to counter rocket, artillery, or mortar attacks. The High Energy Laser
Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) is such a system; it
has completed low power testing for target tracking
and commenced high power (10 kilowatt) field tests.62
The HEL MD is on track to demonstrate “a ruggedized
and supportable high energy laser [50 kilowatt] with
subsystems installed on a tactical military vehicle to
enhance the safety of deployed forces” by 2017.63
Army space experts are also examining potential
offensive force applications that traverse space, such
as the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) designed to “cooperatively develop an alternative vehicle to broaden research and development and reduce
risk to the Prompt Global Strike program.”64 The payload delivery vehicle of the AHW was the Hypersonic
Glide Body (HGB), which itself tested advanced concepts in thermal protection, navigation, guidance, and
control. The AHW completed a successful test flight
on November 17, 2011, from the Pacific Missile Range
Facility in Hawaii to the Reagan Test Site (RTS) at
Kwajalein Atoll. The RTS witnessed another noteworthy accomplishment in 2011 when its millimeter wave
radar was upgraded to make it the highest resolution
imaging radar in the world, a significant capability for
its role as a contributing sensor in the Space Surveillance Network.65
Cyberspace Connections.
Arguably the most rapidly evolving arena of military activity is that of cyberspace operations. In addition to the connections between space and cyberspace
in the nascent cyberspace doctrine, Army space has
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enduring formal ties to the emerging commons. During the initial formation of U.S. Cyber Command as a
subunified command to USSTRATCOM, USASMDC/
ARSTRAT was designated as the interim Army Forces
Cyber Command in 2009, pending the eventual establishment of 2nd Army in that role. With the emphasis of Army space forces on the prompt and secure
exchange of operational information crucial to the
deployed soldier, it is prudent for USACSMDC/ARSTRAT to continue to collaboration with U.S. Army
Cyber Command to ensure unity of effort in all areas
of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) development and refinement.66
This overlap between the space and cyberspace
domains is also evident in the other space service
components. On December 7, 2010, the 24th Air Force
achieved its full operational capability and was formally designated Air Forces Cyber. Less than 3 years later
it took on the role of Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber
to serve as a command and control authority for joint
cyberspace forces.67 But the 24th Air Force remains an
organization within Air Force Space Command, thus
sharing a formal connection with JFCC-Space (the 14th
Air Force). The opposite is true for the Navy, in which
its cyberspace organization also has responsibilities
for space operations. In the Navy’s structure, the commander, 10th Fleet, is the commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command; in this role, the commander also serves
as “the Navy’s central operational authority for space
in support of maritime forces afloat and ashore.68
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Space Policies and Strategies.
The foundation for U.S. military space systems
operations was updated and clarified as part of the
legislatively mandated 2010 Space Posture Review. The
interim report from the study was submitted to Congress in March 2010, and its results helped to form
the contents of the new National Space Policy released
by the White House on June 28, 2010.69 Upon the release of this new national policy, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates emphasized the continued vital nature
of space systems to military operations as well as the
changes in the international space environment that
prompted the review:
Our continued presence in space is vital to our national security. Space-based capabilities are critical to
our military’s ability to navigate accurately, strike precisely, and gather battle space awareness efficiently.
However, changes in the space environment over the
last decade challenge our operations. Today, space
is increasingly contested as our systems face threats
of disruption and attack, increasingly competitive as
more states, private firms, and others develop spacebased capabilities, and increasingly congested with
orbital debris.70

Specifically, the Space Posture Review formed the
National Security Space Guidelines section of the
National Space Policy; these guidelines distinguished
joint and individual responsibilities for the Secretary
of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI).71 The objectives of their collective work is to:
invest in space situational awareness capabilities and
launch vehicle technologies; develop the means to as25

sure mission essential functions enabled by space; enhance our ability to identify and characterize threats;
and deter, defend, and if necessary, defeat efforts to
interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems.72

Guidelines were also provided for commercial and
civil sectors of space activities.73
The DoD and DNI activities in space were further
refined and codified in the National Security Space Strategy, a classified document which was released with
an unclassified summary in January 2011. It echoed
Gates’ earlier comments, stating concisely that “the
current and future strategic environment is driven
by three trends – space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.”74 To operate in
this environment, three overarching national security
space objectives were established:
Strengthen safety, stability, and security in space;
maintain and enhance the strategic national security
advantages afforded to the United States by space;
and energize the space industrial base that supports
U.S. national security.75

In turn, to accomplish these objectives, five interrelated strategic approaches were provided that addressed the spectrum from peaceful and responsible
use of space through the need of operations in a space
environment degraded by effects from adversary attacks.76 These themes have remained consistent and as
previously noted, the goal to “operate effectively in
cyberspace and space” was elevated to be among the
President’s top 10 priorities for DoD efforts promulgated in January 2012.77
How is the Army implementing these priorities
for space operations? Army Space Policy is outlined
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in Army Regulation (AR) 900-1, which declares that
dependency on space-based capabilities:
requires the Army to actively participate in defining space related capability needs that ensure necessary force structure and systems are developed and
acquired to enable the land force to conduct the full
range of military operations now and in the future.78

This policy identifies the five dominant stakeholder communities for space activities within the Army
and briefly outlines their responsibilities regarding
combat development (CBTDEV) and materiel development (MATDEV).79 Together, these five groups
contribute to the Army Space Council, which provides
recommendations through the Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army regarding activities to support four broad
objectives:
1. To maximize the effectiveness of current space
capabilities in support of operational and tactical land
warfighting needs;
2. To influence the design, development, acquisition, and concepts of operation of future space systems that enable and enhance current and future
land forces;
3. To advance the development and effective use
of responsive, timely, and assured Joint interoperable
space capabilities; and,
4. To seamlessly integrate relevant space capabilities into the operating force.
Details and priorities of efforts toward objectives
were outlined in an earlier document, the United States
Army Space Master Plan, issued in 2006 in two versions
(one classified and one unclassified summary).80 It also
identified seven “Army Issues for Resolution” in areas
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such as military SATCOM, use of commercial imagery, and utility of directed energy, which are being addressed in current Army space efforts.81 Also initiated
in 2006 was a Space Operations Concept Capability
Plan to guide a comprehensive capabilities-based assessment (CBA) across not only Army stakeholders,
but joint and interagency players as well.82
While in general terms the Army Space Policy is
consistent with current national guidance, it was last
released in 2009 and thus has not been updated to cite
explicitly the evolving nature of the space environment articulated in the 2011 National Security Space
Strategy. However, the guidance was carried forth in
the Army Space Operations White Paper written in part to
serve as a foundation to conduct an updated space operation CBA; it includes the key concepts that “space
is a contested domain; [and operations therein] need
cross-domain solutions.”83 These efforts are part of the
2011 Army Space Strategic Plan, which was informed
by the national-level space guidance and focused on
efforts “to assure access to resilient and relevant space
capabilities that aid Army forces in unified land operations.”84 Most recently, these tenets were emphasized in the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance under the Strategic Priority of maintaining a ready and
modern Army:
• Integrate Resilient Space Capabilities.
Enable all personnel, not just space specialties, to leverage space capabilities for improved combat effectiveness in contested operational environments, even
in the face of adversary attempts to degrade, disrupt,
or deny access to space capabilities.85
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Essentially, the evolution of space-related themes in
current Army policy and strategy documents appear
to follow consistent trends that are in concert with
national security space guidelines. Implementation
of such guidance will help to ensure the continued
integration of space-based capabilities into unified
land operations.
Budget Trends.
Of course, one of the sure ways to judge the priority
of efforts in the Pentagon is to examine the amount of
resources that are dedicated to them. Figure 1 depicts
the budgets for the space-based systems and missile
defense programs within the context of the overall
DoD equipment modernization portfolio for Fiscal
Year 2015. Together, they comprise $15.4 billion—almost exactly 10 percent of the overall $153.9 billion
modernization base.

($ in Billions)
Space-based

Numbers may not add due to rounding

Figure 1. Space and Missile Defense
Budget Context (Fiscal Year 2015).86
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Missile defense funding dollars include ballistic
missile defense systems ($6.8 billion), tactical ballistic missile defense ($1.0 billion), and tactical missile
defense ($0.4 billion). Priorities are focused on five
systems, two of which are in the Army’s purview; the
others are joint. First, the GMD element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) has continued
funding to purchase GBIs toward the goal of having
40 GBIs at Fort Greely and four GBIs at Vandenberg
AFB by Fiscal Year 2017, as well as technology investments to refine and improve fire control and target
discrimination capabilities. Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) systems are also funded to
continue building an eventual force of 31 interceptor
and associated components as well as support of four
existing THAAD batteries and plans for a fifth battery in Fiscal Year 2015. The sea-based Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense continues to build with funding for
30 SM-3 Block 1B missiles as well as ship equipment
upgrades. The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)
system upgrades continue with funding for improved
communications, interoperability, and electronic warfare capabilities. Related to the PAC-3 is its Missile
Segment Enhancement (MSE) program funding,
which procures 70 MSE interceptor missiles with increased lethality and improved survivability.87
Space-based system funding dollars are broken
down into satellites ($4.2 billion), support ($1.6 billion), and launch ($1.4 billion). The modernization priorities center on six programs (one Navy and five Air
Force), three of which are SATCOM constellations; the
other three are for PNT satellites, infrared surveillance
systems, and space launch vehicles. The Mobile User
Objective System (MUOS) is DoD’s next generation
ultra-high frequency (UHF) SATCOM constellation,
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and its funding covers various aspects of procurement, testing, and launch support for three satellites.
The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
system is a four satellite constellation to replenish the
aging Cold War Military Strategic Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) system. AEHF funding continues procurement
funding for two satellites as well as insertion of new
technologies. The Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)
system is designed to augment and eventually replace
the Defense SATCOM System (DSCS). The WGS funding addresses the checkout, launch, and support costs
for two satellites. The remaining top priorities funds
include GPS system support for the procurement of
two Block III satellites and the continued development
of the next generation operational control system as
well as technology development for user equipment.
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) has continued funding for procurement of two satellites and
technology insertion efforts. Finally, the purchase of
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) block
buys of three launch vehicles continues, as does funding for launch preparation and site operation.88
Since space-based capabilities are becoming increasingly integrated into Army operations, it is difficult to extract the exact amount of money spent for
all space activities in a given budget. Table 5 provides
some highlights of the Army space-related funding in
the Fiscal Year 2015 DoD budget request. It includes
almost 975 million dollars of funding for development, procurement, and support efforts.
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Budget Activity

Space-Related Activity

Budget Amount
(Millions of Dollars)

Aircraft procurement

GPS, SATCOM equipment

148.3

Other procurement

GPS, SATCOM, JTAGS

467.7

Applied research

Sensors, antenna, command &
control

34.4

Advanced technology
development

Command & control, electronic
warfare

36.7

Advanced components &
prototypes

Missile defense, space integration

26.8

System development &
demonstration

SATCOM, tactical networks

62.04

Kwajalein Atoll support

Space & missile testing

176.0

Operational systems development

SATCOM, JTAGS

21.2

Miscellaneous space activities
support

Security, communications

1.4

TOTAL

974.5

Table 5. Key Army Space-Related Funding in
Fiscal Year 2015 DoD Budget.89
The Way Ahead For Army Space Operations.
This monograph examines the past and present of
Army and joint operations as well as how these operations may fit into the congested, contested, and
competitive international space environment. To facilitate the best evolutionary path for future activities,
the monograph recommends the following actions be
considered.
•	The Army should retain its current focus on
space operations as cross-domain support for
terrestrial warfighter operations as it seems appropriate and prudent; it is unlikely that widespread physical warfare will occur in space in
the near future.
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•	The Army should update its Army Space Policy (AR 900-1) to reflect the tenets of the 2011
National Security Space Strategy and to include
cross-domain stakeholder and proponency issues with regard to cyberspace operations.
•	The Army needs to ensure its approach to any
nanosatellite program or similar system-ofsystems comes from an architectural perspective that considers the impacts of these miniconstellations on ongoing military, national,
commercial, and international activities in
same orbit. Also, the Army must consider
how the operational space environment may
change if other countries try to establish similar
constellations.
•	The Army should keep its space organizations
involved with the development of joint cyberspace doctrine and should push for deliberate and dedicated development of cyberspace
theory writ large to better coordinate actions
related to space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum.
•	The Army should retain its emphasis on force
enhancement appropriate for the force with
“the most boots on the ground.” This includes
support from, and exploitation of, space-based
capabilities to “shoot, move, and communicate” better through:
— timely and accurate position, navigation,
and timing data;
— continued refinement and expansion of
friendly force tracking; and,
— continued refinement and expansion of satellite communications.
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•	The Army should continue to integrate international cooperation into its operations to enhance interoperability as well as build crucial
relationships that may provide access to locations critical to the ground-based segments of
space systems.
•	The Army should continue to provide support
to combatant commanders and theater commanders via embedded and deployed teams—
Space Support Elements, Army Space Support
Teams, and Commercial Imagery Teams. The
Army should continue to actively seek feedback
and implement aggressive after-action reports
and lessons learned processes to help ensure
not only the proper number of teams sent, but
also the bringing together of the proper subject
matter mix.
The Army’s development of its space capabilities
and forces continues to evolve to meet the changing
environment for unified land operations as well as the
diverse challenges of ongoing global operations, technological advances by potential adversaries, increased
international competition, and domestic resource constraints. Continuing to advance policies and strategies
that embrace the joint, interagency, and international
aspects of space operations will help to ensure reliable and resilient support to operational and tactical
commanders in any theater of operation.
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